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Monopsony Power in Health Care Markets:
Must the Big Buyer Beware Hard
Bargaining?*
Jack A. Rovner**
Increasingly, sellers of health care goods and providers of health
care services invoke antitrust law to attack customers who refuse
to pay as much or to buy in the same way as they had in the past.'
*

Copyright © 1987 by Jack A. Rovner. All rights reserved.

Partner, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago; B.A., Brandeis University, 1968; J.D., Boston University, 1976. A preliminary draft of this article was presented at the National
Health Lawyers Association Seminar, "Antitrust in the Health Care Field," January 2830, 1987.
1. Among the antitrust cases that have been brought by sellers of health care goods
and providers of health care services against their customers are:
(a) Pharmacists' attacks on insurer prepaid drug plans. See Feldman v.
Health Care Serv. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 518 F. Supp.
1100 (D. Conn. 1981), aff'd per curiam, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982); Sausalito
Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,695 (N.D. Cal.
1980), and 544 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd per curiam, 677 F.2d 47
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 415 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tex. 1976), rei'd, 556 F.2d 1375 (5th
Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 205 (1979), on remand, 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
(b) Practitioners' attacks on insurer prepaid health service plans. See Barry
v. Blue Cross, 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986); Brillhart v. Mutual Medical Ins..
Inc., 768 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1985); Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260 (4th
Cir. 1983); Michigan State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 1987-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,687 (E.D. Mich. 1987), and 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) "
64,801 (E 0. Mich. 1982); Westchester Radiological Associates, P.C. v. Empire
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1167.548 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Tom v. Hawaii Dental Serv., 606 F. Supp. 584 (D. Hawaii 1985): Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n. 574 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa.
1983). aff'd, 745 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied. 471 U.S. 1016 (1985).
and 632 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Pa. 1986), re,'d. 815 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1987):
Davidowitz v. San Diego County Dental Soc'y, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) '
65,231 (S.D. Cal. 1983), on reconsideration. 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) " 65.988
(S.D. Cal. 1984); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass.. Inc., 542 F. Supp. 782 (D.
Mass. 1982), and 582 F. Supp. 734 (D. Mass.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part. 749
F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985) Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clinics. 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) '
63,351 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Anderson v. Medical Serv.. 1976-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) i 60,884 (E.D. Va. 1976).
(c) Hospitals' attacks on insurer preferred provider organizations or prepaid
hospital service plans. See St. Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n
**
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Initially, these cases typically advanced the claim that prepaid insurance plans, such as Blue Cross or Blue Shield, are fixing prices
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' The theory underlying this claim is that prepaid insurance plans are affecting the
prices that providers, as the sellers of health care goods and services, are permitted to charge the plans' insureds, which consume
the health care goods and services. The courts have rejected this
price-fixing theory on the ground that the prepaid insurance plans,
as the payors of the health care goods and services consumed, are
the buyers. 3 In response, providers have evolved a new theory of
of New Orleans, Inc., 712 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970
(1984); Webster County Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. United Mine Workers of Am.
Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 536 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per
curiam); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 603 F. Supp.
1077 (S.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd, 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986); Glen Eden Hosp.,
Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mich.
1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 740 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1984).
(d) Hospital supply vendors' attacks on group purchasing. See Langston
Corp. v. Standard Register Co., 553 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ga. 1982); White &
White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 540 F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Mich.
1982), rev'd, 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983).
A probable explanation for this explosion in antitrust suits against health care customers is that the economics of health care delivery are undergoing rapid and wrenching
changes that are putting severe pressures on providers and suppliers to cut costs. See
Millenson, Managed Care: Will It Push ProvidersAgainst The Wall? HOSPITALS 66 (Oct.
5, 1986); Petitte & Anderson, Major Systems Will Be Shaped by Payers in the Next Decade, MODERN HEALTHCARE 53 (Aug. 15, 1986); Traska, The FinancialExchange: Providers, Insurers, and Employers Stake Claims in New Health Markets, TRUSTEE 22 (Feb.
1986); MacStravic, "Boutiques" and "Shopping Malls" Threaten Hospitals' Traditional
Role, MODERN HEALTHCARE 144 (Sept. 13, 1985); How Competition Is Reshaping
Health Care, HOSPITALS 116 (July 16, 1984).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies
in restraint of trade. Any horizontal arrangement, i.e., an arrangement among competitors, that has the purpose or the effect of "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing" price is illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
3. See Barry v. Blue Cross, 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986); Brillhart v. Mutual Medical
Ins., Inc., 768 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1985); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d
922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985); Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v.
Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'g 574 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa.
1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985); Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins.
Co., 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); Medical Arts
Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 675 F.2d 502 (2d
Cir. 1982) (per curiam), affg 518 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Conn. 1981); Michigan State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 1987-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,687 (E.D. Mich.
1987), and 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,801 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Davidowitz v. San
Diego County Dental Soc'y, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,231 (S.D. Cal. 1983), on
reconsideration, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,988 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Feldman v. Health
Care Serv. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. III. 1982); Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue
Shield, 544 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'dper curiam, 677 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Michigan Ass'n of Psychother-

1987]

Monopsony Power

attack. Turning to section 2 of the Sherman Act,4 providers have
begun alleging that prepaid insurance plans, as big buyers of health
care goods and services, are exercising buyer's monopsony 5 power
to depress below competitive levels the price providers can charge.6
This article takes the position that these monopsony power

claims should not be cognizable under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Instead, the unilateral exercise of monopsony power7 should
be accorded per se legal antitrust treatment, and cases asserting
monopsony-based claims should be rejected on their pleadings. In
examining this position, the article first reviews basic Sherman Act
principles and the economic theory of monopsony. The article
then reviews the case law regarding monopsony. First, the buyer
apy Clinics, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,351 (E.D. Mich. 1980); see also Group Life &
Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1979). For further discussion
of price-fixing in the prescription drug context, see generally Note, Prepaid Prescription
Drug Plans Under Antitrust Scrutiny. A Stern Challenge to Health Care Cost Containment, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 506 (1980).
The only price-fixing claims concerning prepaid insurance plans that have survived are
those in which the plan has been found to be under the control of providers that compete
with each other, thus rendering the plan a form of horizontal arrangement. See Glen
Eden Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., Inc., 740 F.2d 423 (6th Cir.
1984); Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1270-71 (4th Cir. 1983); St. Bernard Gen.
Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n of New Orleans, Inc., 712 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970 (1984); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue
Shield, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); Addino v. Genesee Valley Medical Care, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Rovner, Provider Control and the Third Party Payor Price-Fixing Problem, NATIONAL HEALTH
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST IN THE HEALTH CARE FIELD

(1985) (price-fixing

will generally be found when the mechanism that determines what the prepaid health
insurer will pay for services is controlled by the providers of the services). These provider
control price-fixing cases follow the teachings of Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). See generally Weller, "Free Choice" as a Restraint of Trade
in American Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351 (1984); Youle &
Daw, PreferredProviderOrganizations: An Antitrust Prospective, 1984 ANTITRUST BULL.
301, 328-41.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 prohibits monopolization of or attempts, conbinations, or conspiracies to monopolize trade. Monopolization is defined as the possession of
monopoly power coupled with the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). Monopoly power is the power
to control prices or to exclude competition. United States v. E.I. duPont deNemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
5. "Monopsony is the term used to describe a situation in which the relevant market
for a factor of production is dominated by a single purchaser." Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 794 n.64 (1968).
6. See, e.g., Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc.. 784 F.2d 1325 (7th
Cir. 1986); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985).
7. This article is concerned only with unilateral exercise of buyer power. Issues of
buyer collusion or cartelization to effect anticompetitive ends are outside the scope of this
article.
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power cases that suggest that monopsony may be a viable antitrust
theory are examined. Next, the case law considering monopsony
claims in health care markets is discussed. Finally, the article
demonstrates why antitrust policy and the danger of deterring
competitive conduct mandate a rule of per se legality for
monopsony.
I.

ANTITRUST LAW AND MONOPSONY ECONOMICS

A.

The Sherman Act

Congress enacted the Sherman Act (the "Act") in 1890.8 Called
the "Magna Carta of free enterprise, ' ' 9 the Act is intended to enhance consumer welfare by promoting economic efficiency and
protecting competition.10
Section 1 of the Act is aimed at prohibiting contracts, combinations, or conspiracies involving two or more independent economic
actors which have the purpose or the effect of unreasonably restraining trade."' The restraints reached by section 1 can be hori8. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11
(1982)).
9. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
10. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940):
The end sought [by the Sherman Act] was the prevention of restraints to free
competition in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict
production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of
purchasers or consumers of goods and services ....
See also National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984)
(consumer welfare a "fundamental goal of antitrust law"); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984) (antitrust laws "especially intended to serve" the
interests of consumers); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) ("Congress
designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription' "); Ball Memorial Hosp.,
Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir. 1985) ("antitrust laws
protect efficient production for the benefit of consumers"); Product Liab. Ins. Agency.
Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 1982) (antitrust laws
"designed to protect the consumer interest in competition"); I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPiICArION

7 (1978) ("[t]he economic objective of a procompetitive policy is to maximize consumer
economic welfare"); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978) (the antitrust laws
are consistent with an overriding concern for consumer welfare).
II. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents. 468 U.S. 85. 98
(1984). Section I states in pertinent part that "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The
Supreme Court recognized early that the literal language of section 1 would outlaw every
form of agreement and, accordingly, construed the statute as prohibiting only those restraints of trade that unreasonably restrict competition. Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
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zontal (among competitors) 2 or vertical
(among actors at different
3
levels in the chain of distribution).'
The reasonableness of a restraint is tested by whether it "merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition" or whether
it "may suppress or even destroy competition."' 4 Application of
this "rule of reason" test usually requires intensive analysis of the
nature, history, and purpose of the restraint, the reasons for adopting it, and its competitive effects on the particular markets
involved. 5
The rule of reason analysis can be complex and time consuming.
Accordingly, the courts have adopted a rule of per se illegality for
certain practices that are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable 6 "because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue." 7 To minimize instances when its inflexibil12. See. e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States
v. Scaly, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
14. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see FTC v. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984): Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441
U.S. 1 (1979).
15. See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Accord National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
16. The courts have adopted rules of per se illegality for four categories of conduct:
(a) Price-fixing, whether horizontal or vertical. See Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (horizontal); Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (vertical); Albrecht v. Herald Co.,
390 U.S. 145 (1968) (vertical); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392 (1927) (horizontal).
(b) Naked allocations of markets or customers among competitors. See
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). But see National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van
Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 880 (1987); Polk
Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).
(c) Group boycotts. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127
(1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). But see
FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986); Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery Printing Co.. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
(d) Tying arrangements. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958). But see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. I v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
17. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1. 5 (1958). The Northern Pacific
court stated the rule in the following manner:
The utility of such a per se rule is that it not only makes the type of restraints
which are prescribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity of an incredibly complicated and
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a
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ity may inadvertently penalize competitive conduct, the rule of per
se illegality is reserved only for conduct that "facially appears to be
[the type] that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output."'"
Because section 1 requires a plurality of actors,19 it does not
reach unilateral conduct. Such conduct is covered instead by section 2 of the Act.2 ° Section 2 focuses on abuse of monopoly
power-the power to control prices or to exclude competition. 2'
Section 2 makes no mention of monopsony.2 2 Though there are
cases involving abuse of buying power,2 3 the legality of monopsony
has received scant judicial attention.24 One possible explanation
particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless
when undertaken.
Id.
18. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979);
see National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98-104 (1984).
For the four categories of conduct deemed per se illegal, see supra note 16.
19. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
20. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984).
The text of section 2 reads:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
21. See supra note 4.
22. See supra note 20. Senator Sherman may not have intended the law that bears his
name to cover monopsony. During the debates on the proposed Sherman Act, Senator
George of Mississippi commented that the cotton farmers had agreed not to purchase jute
bagging in order to combat the jute bagging trust. In response to Senator George's fear
that the bill would sweep into its reach such "defensive agreements" as the cotton farmers' buyers' cartel, Senator Sherman stated that "[tihere is nothing in the bill to prevent a
refusal by anybody to buy something. All that it says is that the people producing or
selling a particular article shall not make combinations to advance the price of the necessaries of life." 20 CONG. REC. 1458 (1889).
23. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173
(1944); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1052 (1984); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); McCourt
v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978), vacated, 600 F.2d 1193
(6th Cir. 1979); In re National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n, 65 F.T.C. 583 (1964), enjbrced. 345
F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965). For an analysis of the cartelization of baseball into a monopsony to control player salaries, see Note, Monopsony in Manpower. Organized Baseball
Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576 (1953).
24. A Lexis search for cases mentioning monopsony, monopsonist, monopsonize and
related words located 40 opinions, eight of which do not involve Sherman Act claims. Of
the 32 Sherman Act cases, nearly all make only a passing reference to monopsony. Only
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for this dearth of monopsony cases is that sellers may be loathe to
sue customers. Another is that a seller complaining that its customer refuses to pay as high a price as the seller might like does not
make a sympathetic antitrust plaintiff. At any rate, monopsony
has been alleged in very few antitrust cases outside health care

areas. 25
B.

The Economic Theory of Monopsony

Monopsony is a market structure within which there is only a
single buyer,26 just as monopoly is a market structure within which
there is only a single seller. 27 An examination of monopoly assists
the understanding of monopsony's theoretical drawbacks.
Economic theory condemns monopoly because it results in a
misallocation of resources. 28 This misallocation occurs because the
monopolist, in order to maximize its profits,2 9 will restrict output
to the point at which its marginal revenue-the incremental income from selling one more unit of output-equals its marginal
cost-the incremental expense of producing one more unit.30
In a competitive market each firm is a price-taker, and its marginal revenue will equal price.3 1 In a monopoly, however, the monopolist is a price-maker, and its marginal revenue will be below
price.3 2 This gives the monopolist both the incentive and the ability to reduce its output and sell at a price that exceeds the cost to
one-Custom Auto Body, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,629, at 69,185 (D.R.I. 1983), discussed infra at notes 76-91 and accompanying textattempts to identify a set of elements to be proved to establish an abuse of monopsony
power. That case, however, involved only section 1 claims; no section 2 claims were
alleged.
25. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES
AND OTHER MATERIALS 150 (2d ed. 1981).

26.

E. MANSFIELD,

PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS

314 (3d ed. 1980).

27. Id. at 240.
28. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 371-72 (11th ed. 1980); E. MANSFIELD, supra
note 26, at 249-50.
29. For a succinct discussion of whether firms really try to maximize profits, see R.
POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 25, at 855-57. See also P. SAMUELSON. supra
note 28, at 477-78; E. MANSFIELD, supra note 26, at 117-18. For expositions of the view
that firms seek to maximize other goals, see J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL
STATE (3d ed. 1976); W. BAUMO[, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE ANI) GROWTH (rev. ed.
1967).
30. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 26, at 244-45.
31. See id. at 246.
32. See id. at 243, 245. The monopolist's marginal revenue will be below price because, presumably, the monopolist would have to lower the price of its entire output in
order to have a price that will attract an additional unit of sale.
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society of producing additional units.3 3 There is a "deadweight
loss" to society in the monopolist's output restriction, and economic inefficiency results.34
Essentially the same economic analysis supports the theory that
monopsony causes a misallocation of resources.3 5 According to
theory, the monopsonist, being a price-maker, has the incentive
and the ability to restrict its purchase of inputs to the point at
which its incremental cost of buying one more unit of input equals
the marginal contribution of that additional unit of input to the
monopsonist's own output.36 The monopsonist's purchase volume
would thus be below the level of purchases expected in a competitive input market, and economic theory predicts that price would
be depressed below the competitive market equilibrium.3 7 A
"deadweight loss" to society would occur in the reduced supply of
the input, and economic inefficiency would exist.3"
The symmetry between the economic theories of monopoly and
monopsony provides intellectual consistency; the symmetry, however, does not fit easily into real world contexts.3 9 While the incentive to monopolize is clear, the incentive to monopsonize is not.
Monopoly provides the attractive business setting of an ability to
control market output, charge monopoly prices and reap
33. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 28, at 371-72.
34. Id. at 486; E. MANSFIELD, supra note 26, at 249-50. Both Samuelson and Mansfield provide graphs in their texts to illustrate the "deadweight loss."
35. See Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984)
("monopoly and monopsony are symmetrical distortions of competition from an economic standpoint"); Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 453 n.6 (7th Cir. 1980)
("[in economic jargon, monopsony is as evil as monopoly"); see also H. HOVENKAMP,
ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 17-18 (1985)

("monopsony produces a

deadweight loss triangle similar to the deadweight loss triangle produced by monopoly").
36. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 25, at 149; E. MANSFIELD, supra
note 26, at 314-15. The monopsonist's marginal contribution will be above supply price
because, presumably, the monopsonist would have to pay the higher price needed to induce its suppliers to produce one more unit of supply for all of the units of supply it buys.
37. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 25, at 149-50; II P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 10, at 311 n.7; IV P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, at
202 n.2 (1980); H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 17-18.
38. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 17-18. For a graph illustrating the "deadweight loss," see R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 25, at 149.
39. Economists generally do not seem overly concerned with monopsony. Professor
Samuelson's renowned textbook on economics, for example, makes minimal mention of
it, and then only in the context of describing how unions can provide countervailing
power for the monopsonistic-employer in a company town. See P. SAMUELSON, supra
note 28, at 548-49. The book does not examine the effects of monopsony in product
markets. Professor Mansfield's economics textbook also discusses monopsony only in the
labor context. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 26, at 314-15. For a discussion of monopsony in the employment context for team sports, see Note, supra note 23.
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supracompetitive profits without the bother that competitors may
bid customers away. If a monopsonist, however, depresses too vigorously its suppliers' prices, it will succeed only in eliminating
sources of inputs by driving potential suppliers out of the input
market.4 0 While a business might relish being the sole seller, few
businesses would take comfort in a reduction in their sources for
supplies.4"
Moreover, the capacity to monopsonize an input market depends on the existence of resources having substantially greater
value in some uses than in others.4 2 Since few inputs are likely to
be so specialized as to preclude other uses, the incentive to monopsonize is small because the monopsonist is unlikely to be able to
prevent its suppliers from leaving the input market.4 3 Thus, efforts
to monopsonize inputs seem unlikely."
40. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 17-18.
41. Cf Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636 (D. Md. 1979), aff'd
mem., 636 F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981). Judges Posner
and Easterbrook, when professors, observed that one danger faced by a monopsonist
whose pricing drives suppliers from the market is that the remaining suppliers may have
an easier task in cartelizing the supplier market to achieve countervailing monopoly
power. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 25, at 720.
One commentator suggests that monopsony in health care markets will benefit consumers by providing countervailing power to the market dominance of health care
providers.
A monopsonist ... by exercising countervailing power [in health care markets],
can provide consumers with lower prices provided that the monopsonist is subject to a competitive market below and is forced to pass its savings on to
consumers....
The capacity of monopsonies to induce a competitive market response, correct
market misallocations, and reduce prices strongly suggests that buyer market
power does not have the same anticompetitive effect as seller market power and,
therefore, should be treated more favorably under the antitrust laws than seller
power.
Note, supra note 3, at 522-23 (footnotes omitted).
This theory of countervailing power has appeal in health care markets given their wellrecognized competitive imperfections. See Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2.
686 F.2d 286, 290-91 (5th Cir. 1982), revd, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y. 643 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 332 (1982): In
re American Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. 2, 115-19 (1984); Alpert & McCarthy, Beyond
Goldfarb: Applying Traditional Antitrust Analyses to Changing Health Markets. 1984
ANTITRUST Buttl. 165. The position of this article-that monopsonization should be per
se legal-does not rest on a theory of countervailing power.
42. As Judges Posner and Easterbrook explained, when professors, [i]f the machinery used to make widgets can be used just as productively to make gidgets. the sole purchaser of widgets will not be able to force the widget maker to accept a monopsony
price." R. POSNER & F. EASTERFROOK, supra note 25, at 150.
43. See id.
.IV P. ARID,\ & D.
44. See id. (incidence of monopsony probably "quite rare").
TURNER, supra note 10, at 204 (1980) ("buyer collusion to reduce prices is a relatively
rare phenomenon").
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The Supreme Court

The cardinal case examining abuse of buyer power is the
Supreme Court's 1948 decision in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co. 45 Mandeville Island Farms came to
the Supreme Court after being dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action.46 The plaintiffs were northern California growers of
sugar beets, and the defendant was one of the three sugar beet refiners that were the "only practical market available" to the growers to sell their beets.47 Although only one of the refiners was
named as a defendant, the growers complained that all three had
agreed to adopt identical form contracts that they would offer the
growers in order to effect uniform purchase pricing.48 This agreement essentially vested the refiners with monopsony power over
the growers.4 9
The issue before the Court was whether the alleged agreement
sufficiently affected interstate commerce to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.5 0 The Court found that it did. 51 The
Court also found that the complaint's allegations of an agreement
45. 334 U.S. 219 (1948). Though there were earlier cases involving abuse of buying
power-most notably United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944)none involved claims of depressed prices caused by an exercise of monopsony power.
46. The ground for the dismissal was lack of effect on interstate commerce. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 64 F. Supp. 265, 266 (S.D. Cal.
1946), aff'd per curiam, 159 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 219 (1948). The
Sherman Act reaches only conduct that affects "trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See McClain v. Real Estate Bd. of
New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425
U.S. 738 (1976); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (monopolizations of and attempts to monopolize interstate or foreign commerce).
47. Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 222. In addition to being the growers' only
practical customers, the refiners allegedly controlled the supply of sugar beet seed to the
growers and, by standard contracts, retained the right "to supervise the planting, cultivation, irrigation and harvesting of the beets." Id. at 222-23.
48. Id. at 223.
49. The Court stressed that, "[s]ince the refiners controlled ...the only practical
market for beets grown in northern California, when the new contracts were offered to
the farmers, they had the choice of either signing or abandoning sugar beet farming." Id.
The Court nowhere considered whether the growers had options to contract to plant
crops other than sugar beet before the planting season. If such options existed, then the
refiners would have faced competition from processors of other agricultural products in
contracting with growers and would not have had monopsony power. See supra notes 4244 and accompanying text.
50. Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 221-22; see supra note 46.
51. Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 234.
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to fix purchase prices stated a claim under the Sherman Act. 2
The Court then proceeded to examine in detail the relationship
between the refiners and the growers. 5 3 Commenting that the refiners "dominate[d] the entire industry," 5 4 the Court described the
growers as being at the mercy of the refiners: "The farmers' only
alternative to dealing with one of the three refiners is to stop growing beets. They can neither plant nor sell except at the refiners'
pleasure and on their terms.""
The Court's discussion of the refiners' monopsony power,
though apparently dicta,5 6 may reflect its unspoken uneasiness with
condemning too broadly combinations of buyers to get lower
prices. The Court's discussion may be a signal, not that monopsonization should be illegal, but that buyer combinations should be
legal unless they have monopsony power.5 7 That signal is consis52. Id. at 235. The Court stated, "[i]t is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination condemned by the Act, even though the price-fixing was by purchasers, and the
persons specially injured under the treble damage claim are sellers, not customers or
consumers." Id.
53. See id. at 239-41.
54. Id. at 240.
55. Id.
56. As most subsequent cases have recognized, Mandeville Island Farms simply involved an alleged conspiracy to fix prices. See, e.g., Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass.,
Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 925 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985); Vogel v.
American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1159 n.14 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980);
Custom Auto Body, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1,
65,629, at 69,187 (D.R.I. 1983); Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1100, 1108 n.9 (D. Conn. 1981), aff'd per
curiam, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982); In re National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n, 65 F.T.C.
583, 611 (1964), enforced, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965). In fact, that was the nature of
the violation found after trial on the remand of the case. See American Crystal Sugar Co.
v. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc., 195 F.2d 622 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957
(1952). Such conduct has long been held illegal per se. See, e.g.. United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) ("[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se").
57. This signal that buyer combinations lacking monopsony power should be legal is
consistent with the current trend of Supreme Court decisions under the Sherman Act that
eschew labels like "price-fixing" or "group boycotts" and instead look to the substance of
challenged combinations, with particular emphasis on the existence of market power, in
order to determine if they promote economic efficiency and output to the benefit of consumers or have the opposite effect. See, e.g.. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct,
2009 (1986); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284 (1985); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents. 468 U.S. 85
(1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The
lower courts follow this trend. See. e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 880 (1987): Polk Bros. v. Forest
City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985); General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck
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tent with the admonition that buyer power is not to be conclusively
presumed bad given just five days before the Mandeville Island
Farms decision in United States v. Griffith.5
Griffith involved a Government Sherman Act challenge to the
practice of large movie theater chains using the "buying power of
the entire circuit in acquiring [various] exclusive privileges" from
the licensors of motion pictures. 9 By negotiating for motion pic-

ture exhibition rights for their entire circuits, the defendants were
combining movie theaters in towns in which they had competition
with those in which they did not have competition. 60 The Court
condemned this practice as an illegal exercise of monopoly power
aimed at the defendants' competitors in those towns in which the
defendants' movie theaters had competition." In doing so, however, the Court cautioned that simply using size to drive a hard
bargain is not necessarily illegal.6" This caution suggests that Mandeville Island Farms is not intended to establish that section 2 of
the Sherman Act reaches monopsonization.6 3
B.

The Lower Courts

Two lower courts have extensively examined the implications of
Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984); Shop & Save Food Mkts., Inc. v. Pneumo
Corp., 683 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); United States v. Realty
Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
58. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
59. Id. at 104.
60. Id. at 102-03.
61. Id. at 108. Griffith and the similar cases of Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948), and United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173
(1944), involve monopoly leveraging, not monopsony price depression; and the targets of
the leveraging were the defendants' competitors, not the defendants' suppliers.
62. Griffith, 334 U.S. at 108.
63. In United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944), a movie theater circuit case factually similar to Griffith, the Court admonished that the buying power
abuses found unlawful in that case should not be analogized "to a case where purchasing
power is pooled so that the buyers may obtain more favorable terms." Id. at 183.
The authorities appear to favor rule of reason analysis, see supra text accompanying
notes 14-15, for group purchasing arrangements to obtain lower prices. See Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985);
White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983):
Langston Corp. v. Standard Register Co.. 553 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ga. 1982); In re Associated Greeting Card Distribs. of Am.. 50 F.T.C. 631 (1954); see also Rovner, Hospital

Group Purchasing After White & White and Langston,

NATIONAl

HFALTH L.\WYERS

AssocIATION, HEAILTH LAW UPDATF- (1984). Cf National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v.
FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 427 (7th Cir. 1965) (while enforcing FTC order against a buyers'
price-fixing cartel, court stressed that FTC expressly "'did not hold 'that . . . all buying
agencies or other cooperative buying arrangements ... are unlawful under the antitrust
laws' "). Group purchasing is outside the scope of this Article, which is concerned with
unilateral, not collective, buyer conduct.
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monopsony claims. Shapiro v. General Motors Corp." appears to
be the first reported case to involve a true monopsony-type claim.
Decided in 1979, Shapiro presented sections 1 and 2 claims premised on the theory that auto makers were restraining an alleged
market for innovation because they required a royalty-free second
source licensee for all of their supplies to guarantee a steady stream
of inputs from multiple sources.65 The plaintiffs had invented and
patented an automobile seat belt retractor but, because of the auto
makers' royalty-free licensing requirements, were unable to license
their invention in return for item-by-item royalties.66
The court first examined the plaintiffs' section 1 claims and
found no evidence of a conspiracy either among the auto makers or
with their suppliers. 61 Turning to the section 2 claims, the court
immediately recognized that these claims were novel because the
monopsony allegations "complicate[d] not only the legal analysis
but the economic and policy aspects of the case as well." '68 Observing that the "plaintiffs [came] very close to admitting that the roy64. 472 F. Supp. 636 (D. Md. 1979), aff'd mem., 636 F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981).
65. 472 F. Supp. at 639. At the time Shapiro was decided, the massive In re Beef
Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980),
alleging a broad conspiracy among supermarket chains to depress the price of beef, had
been proceeding on the heels of the successful section 1 case based on a similar conspiracy
in Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal.), vacated and dismissed on
settlement, 403 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Cal. 1975). About two months after the Shapiro
decision, the Fifth Circuit reversed dismissal of the In re Beef case on grounds that the
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that the transactions between the middlemen-meat packers (to whom the plaintiff-cattlemen sold) and the defendant-supermarket chains were the
functional equivalent of cost-plus contracts and, therefore, within one of the exceptions to
the bar of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In reBeef,600 F.2d at 116667. Illinois Brick held that only direct purchasers from antitrust conspirators may sue for
damages for illegal overcharges and that indirect purchases further down the chain of
distribution may not sue even though the illegal overcharges were passed-through to
them. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.
In In re Beef, the Fifth Circuit undertook a somewhat extensive analysis of monopsony
and oligopsony power, see 600 F.2d at 1158-59, to examine the plaintiffs' contention "that
Illinois Brick is entirely inappropriate to price-fixing suits brought by sellers against indirect purchasers" because "the harm engendered by monopsony or oligopsony pricing of
the kind alleged is, as a categorical matter, greater than that engendered by monopoly
pricing," id. at 1158. The court found that contention thoroughly unpersuasive: "There
is nothing special about monopsony or oligopsony price-fixing cases that justifies treating
them differently from monopoly price-fixing cases for passing-on purposes." Id. at 1159.
On remand, summary judgment was entered for the defendant-supermarket chains because the plaintiffs could not produce sufficient evidence to sustain the cost-plus exception allegations. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig.. 542 F. Supp. 1122. 1140-42 (N.D.
Tex. 1982), aff'd, 710 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1983). cert. denied. 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
66. Shapiro, 472 F. Supp. at 639.
67. Id. at 641-47.
68. Id. at 648.
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alty-free licensing policy [meant] lower consumer prices,"69 the
court sharply focused on the tension between the plaintiffs' monopsony claim and the pro-consumer thrust of antitrust law.7" The
court explained that the major car manufacturers, "behaving as
rational economic decision makers "were simply" bargaining with
their suppliers (plaintiffs' licensees) to secure the seat belt retractors at lower prices,"'" and noted that the plaintiffs had been "outbargained. 7' 2 The court recognized that the auto makers' hardbargaining "benefit[ted]
consumers" 73 and warned that
"[a]bandoning the royalty-free licensing policy would undoubtedly
raise prices for defendants, and, just incidentally, line plaintiffs'
pockets."74
The court dismissed the complaint. But the dismissal was not
premised on a finding that monopsonization fails to state a claim.
Rather, it was based on lack of standing to assert any antitrust
claim, including the monopsonization claim. 5
The second decision, Custom Auto Body, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. ,76 involved a Sherman Act challenge to an insurer's
"preferred" auto body repair shop program. Under the program,
the insurer paid only what it considered the "competitive cost" of
repair as an incentive for its insureds to compare auto repair shops
for price. If an insured selected a shop that charged more than the
"competitive cost" as determined by the insurer, the insured paid
the excess. 77 To ease the shopping burden of its insureds, the insurer contracted with selected repair shops that were willing to
'78
charge no more than the "competitive cost."
The plaintiff, an auto repair shop without a contract with the
insurer, attacked the program as an unreasonable trade restraint in
violation of section 1.7' The plaintiff's allegation that the insurer
had sufficient monopsony power to force auto repair shops to con69. Id.
70. Id.; see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
71. Shapiro, 472 F. Supp. at 648.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The court found that the plaintiffs' alleged injury was "both indirect and incidental" because i[w]hile they may consider themselves a 'target area,' the impact reaches
them only as a result of the loss of royalties which, in turn, follows from the business
agreement between the licensees (suppliers) and the car manufacturers." Id. at 661.
76. 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,629 (D.R.I. 1983).
77. Id. at 69,179.
78. Id. at 69,179-80.
79. Id. at 69,178.
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tract with it at an "artificially low price" was vital to its claim.8 0
Although the plaintiff asserted no section 2 claim, the court was
sufficiently intrigued with the plaintiff's monopsony power theory
that it denied the defendant's summary judgment motion.8 '
The court considered the plaintiff's monopsony power allegation
sufficient to require rule of reason scrutiny of the agreements between the defendant and its preferred repair shops.8 2 To test for
anticompetitive effect, the court identified three elements of an
abuse of monopsony power:
First, the buyer must have "significant market power" for
its
83
purchases to "have an appreciable effect on total output";
Second, the buyer must make its purchases in an industry with
"a rising cost curve" (an industry in which the incremental cost
to produce one more unit of output increases); 84 and
Third, the buyer must have "the power to restrict its purchases
to a particular amount."8 5
The court recognized that, only when all three of these conditions are satisfied, is it rational for a large-scale buyer to limit its
purchases "to a smaller quantity of goods at a lower price than
would be prevalent under conditions of free competition." 86 Only
then does an exercise of monopsony power restrict output and create the economic inefficiency of a "deadweight loss.""8
The court's conclusion that an exercise of monopsony power to
depress price can sustain a section 1 rule of reason claim, particularly when no section 2 monopsonization claim is alleged, is unsound. The logical corollary of that approach would be that any
sale by a monopolist could be attacked under section 1 as an unreasonable trade restraint even if the monopolist had attained its mar80.

Id. at 69,184.

81. Id. at 69,186. The court, however, granted the defendant summary judgment on
the plaintiff's per se price-fixing and group boycott claims. Id. at 69,183-84, 69.187-91.

69,192.
82. Id. at 69,184.
83. Id. at 69,185.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see IV P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, at 202 n.2. Although no
evidence had been offered on the first or second element, the court declined to dismiss the
plaintiff's section 1 claim because "it would be open to the defendant to restrict the level
of repair service purchased by arranging for its preferred shops to perform repairs of an
inferior quality."

Custom Auto Body, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)

65,629, at 69,186. The

First Circuit's subsequent decision in Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922
(1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985), discussed infra at notes 136-46 and
accompanying text, rejected this analysis.

86.

Custom Auto Body, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)

87.

See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.

65,629, at 69,185.
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ket status legally under section 2.88 But a monopolist has the right
to compete89 and even to enjoy the benefits of supracompetitive
pricing if it has attained and remained a monopoly legally." Thus,
the court's view that a unilateral exercise of monopsony power can
amount9 to an unreasonable trade restraint violative of section 1 is
wrong."
88. Monopoly obtained "as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident" does not violate section 2. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 571 (1966); see United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (1945)
(not illegal to have monopoly "thrust upon" or attained "by virtue of ...superior skill,
foresight and industry"); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
341 (D. Mass. 1953) (section 2 does not condemn one "who merely by superior skill and
intelligence.., got the whole business because nobody else could do it as well"), aff'dper
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
89. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980):
[I]t would be inherently unfair to condemn success when the Sherman Act itself
mandates competition. Such a wooden rule ... might also deprive the leading
firm in an industry of the incentive to exert its best efforts. Further success
would yield not rewards but legal castigation. The antitrust laws would thus
compel the very sloth they were intended to prevent.
Accord MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1114
(7th Cir.) (it is "in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage in
vigorous competition"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 544-46 (9th Cir. 1983) ("monopolist, no less than any
other competitor, is permitted and indeed encouraged to compete aggressively on the
merits"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant manufacturer's
acts constituted reasonable, procompetitive conduct); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 436-44 (N.D. Cal.) (defendant
manufacturer's acts constituted reasonable response to competition), ajd 636 F.2d 1188
(1978); see United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945)
("[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon
when he wins"). Cf Official Airlines Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980)
(monopolist publisher had no duty to publish schedule of commuter airlines, even when
nonpublication put airlines at a significant disadvantage).
90. See Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1339
(7th Cir. 1986) ("monopolists may raise prices to customers, may charge what the traffic
will bear, so long as they came by their market power lawfully"); Kartell v. Blue Shield of
Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 927 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985) ("even a
monopolist is free to exploit whatever market power it may possess when that exploitation takes the form of charging uncompetitive prices"); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 n.12 (2d Cir. 1979) ("a lawful monopolist ordinarily [is
not] precluded from charging as high a price for its product as the market will accept"),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); id. at 294 ("no court has required a lawful monopolist
to forfeit to a purchaser three times the increment of its price over that which would
prevail in a competitive market"); see also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc..
429 U.S. 477 (1977) ("[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants' acts unlawful"). Cf Youle & Daw, supra note 3, at 314-17 ("a monopolist's
refusal to give one of its suppliers favored treatment does not violate Section 2").
91. Cf Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984)
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III.

MONOPSONY THEORY APPLIED IN
HEALTH CARE MARKETS

A.

The Early Cases

The early antitrust cases involving health care markets tended to
focus on section 1 price-fixing issues. 92 Several, however, mention
monopsony in a manner which, by implication, suggests that
monopsonization is a viable section 2 claim. One of the earliest is
Webster County Memorial Hospital,Inc. v. United Mine Workers of
America Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950,93 which is among the
first of a long line of cases involving attacks by health care provid94
ers upon prepaid service benefit plans that buy their services.
The hospital in Webster County had contracts with the United
Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950
(the "Fund") under which the hospital provided services to the
Fund's beneficiaries and was paid by the Fund in accordance with
the pricing terms of the contracts. 95 The Fund had refused the
hospital's demands for price increases in what the hospital was permitted to charge the Fund under the contracts.96 The Fund also
had prohibited the hospital from charging the Fund's beneficiaries
for the excess that the Fund refused to pay.97 Frustrated, the hospital filed suit claiming that the Fund violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act by fixing prices for the hospital care provided the
Fund's beneficiaries and by threatening a boycott. 9
The hospital theorized that the beneficiaries were the buyers,
notwithstanding that the Fund paid for the services.9 9 The hospital
asserted that the Fund interfered with the pricing structure between the hospital as seller and the beneficiaries as buyers.° 0 The
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim,
and the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the dismissal.""
The court recognized the similarity of the Fund's status "to that
of a group buying agent negotiating a price for medical care on
("the conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful only when it
threatens actual monopolization").
92. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
93. 536 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
94. See supra note 1.
95. Webster County Memorial Hosp.. 536 F.2d at 419-20.
96. Id. at 420.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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behalf of its beneficiaries,"102 and stressed that "negotiations with
suppliers of medical care as alleged in this case, without more," do
not amount to an unreasonable restraint of trade."°3 The court also
remarked that the hospital had not alleged monopoly or monopsony.' O4 The court thus implied that, had plaintiff alleged monopsony power by the Fund, the "more" may have been supplied and
a cognizable claim stated.
A similar implication for health care plaintiffs appeared in Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Connecticut, Inc. 105 In that case, pharmacies challenged an insurer's prepaid prescription drug plan as price-fixing violative of
section 1. Under the plan, insureds who bought the coverage could
obtain prescription drugs from any pharmacy participating in the
plan at nominal or no cost to them; the participating pharmacy
was paid by the insurer at the rate set in the participation contract
between the insurer and the pharmacy. 0 6 If the insured obtained
the prescription drug at a nonparticipating pharmacy, the insured
had to pay the full amount charged by the pharmacy and would
receive reimbursement from the insurer only up to the amount set
by the insurer's participation contracts with participating pharma07
cies; the excess, if any, was borne by the insured.1
that the defendant insurer was the purchaser,' 8 the disgranted summary judgment dismissing the price-fixing
In reaching this result, the district court noted that
conclusory claim of 'buyer conspiracy' . . . must also
fail."" 0 This conclusion was correct because the court had already
found that there had been no claim that the defendant had conspired with any other payors who offered comparable prescription
drug plans."I' But rather than reiterate this finding as the basis for
rejecting the plaintiffs' buyer conspiracy contention, the court resorted to the plaintiffs' failure to allege that the defendant had
Finding
trict court
claims. 0 9
"plaintiffs'

102. Id. For authorities addressing the legality of group purchasing arrangements,
see supra note 63.
103.
Webster County Memorial Hosp., 536 F.2d at 420.

104.

Id.

105.

518 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Conn. 1981), affd per curiain, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir.

1982).
106.

518 F. Supp. at 1103.

107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.at 1109.
Id.

110.
111.

Id. at 1108 n.9.
Id. at 1106.
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"dominant buying power in the market."" Once again, the court
implied that, had the plaintiffs pleaded and shown monopsony
power, their claims would have survived. The court also stressed,
however, apparently to distinguish Mandeville Island Farms, that,
"to establish a 'buyer conspiracy,' plaintiffs must show not only
monopsony power, but something more than the mere existence of
a group of buyers." ' 1 3 The "something more" is left unspecified.
The Second Circuit affirmed the summary judgment.' 14 It also
reinforced the implications of the district court's comments on monopsony power by instructing that the plaintiffs had nowhere
claimed that the defendant's ten percent market share gave it "monopsony power with which it might be capable of obtaining agreeArguably, the message is
ments with anticompetitive effect."' '
that, if the market share is big enough, there may be sufficient monopsony power to sustain a seller's Sherman Act claim that a
purchasing agreement obtained without collusion by a powerful
buyer could be anticompetitive.
St. Bernard General Hospital, Inc. v. Hospital Service Association
of New Orleans, Inc. 116 also contains a gratuitous reference to monopsony. The case presented price-fixing claims analogous to those
in Webster County Memorial Hospital,'1 except that horizontal aspects were found to have been alleged. 18 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the price-fixing claim
because it found sufficient evidence of hospital control of the thirdparty payor defendant to support a finding of a horizontal conspiracy. '' The Fifth Circuit also found it "notabl[e]" that the plaintiff
had not alleged "abuse of monopoly or monopsony power under
Section 2." ' 120 The Court did not elaborate, however, on why this
omission by the plaintiff was notable. The implication is that the
plaintiff missed an opportunity to assert a cognizable claim for
monopsonization. 121
112. Id. at 1108 n.9.
113. Id.
114. 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
115. Id. at 507.
116. 712 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970 (1984).
117. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
118. 712 F.2d at 985-87. Regarding the significance of the horizontal aspects. see
supra note 3.
119. St. Bernard General Hosp., 712 F.2d at 987.
120. Id. at 987 n.15.

121. For other cases containing similar negative pregnants concerning monopsonization, see Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 532 n.9 (7th Cir. 1986) (in antitrust
case over rivalry for purchase of the Chicago Bulls National Basketball Association
franchise, court notes, if relevant market alleged had been "national sports franchises."
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The Recent Cases

With it becoming apparent from the earlier cases that a pricefixing theory would be unavailing unless a horizontal conspiracy
could be shown,12 2 providers began to act on the signals that a monopsony theory might work. They started to augment their section
1 claims with section 2 monopsony theories.
The first of these cases was Pennsylvania Dental Association v.
Medical Service Association. 23 That case presented a hybrid claim
in which the plaintiffs asserted monopolization under section 2,
though the gravamen of their complaint was that the defendant
was exercising monopsony power over them.124 The plaintiff dentists argued that there were two relevant markets: (a) a market for
the sale of dental insurance, consisting of (i) a submarket for the
sale of prepaid dental service insurance and (ii) a submarket for the
sale of all other forms of dental insurance; and (b) a market for the
purchase of dental services, consisting of (i) a submarket for the
purchase of dental care by individuals and (ii) a submarket for the
purchase of "bulk" dental care by prepaid dental service insurance
then "the charge would be monopsony, that is, that [the defendant] had made itself the
only buyer of basketball franchises in Chicago"); Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d
648, 655 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[tlhe closest antitrust violation to anything alleged in this case
would be a conspiracy among buyers to depress the price of a product that they buy by
limiting the amount they buy-a conspiracy, in the language of antitrust economics, to
monopsonize,' " but no such allegation made); Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp.,
632 F.2d 539, 547-48 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that the plaintiff lacked standing, court
comments that the plaintiff "would arguably be within the 'target area' " on a claim that
"monopoly power or a conspiracy in restraint of trade at the refining level might give the
defendant oil companies monopsony or oligopsony power to dictate prices at which sellers of crude oil would be able to sell their product").
A contrary message appears in Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d
1195 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982). That case involved Sherman Act
§ I claims brought by auto body repair shops to challenge insurers' preferred repair shop
plans similar in operation to that in Custom Auto Body, see supra text accompanying
notes 76-78, and to the prescription drug plan in Medical Arts Pharmacy, see supra text
accompanying notes 105-07. In rejecting the claims, the Seventh Circuit was unpersuaded by pleas that the defendants "as large-scale purchasers of services wield substantial market power through use of these preferred repair shop agreements." Quality Auto
Body, 660 F.2d at 1204. The court admonished that "[t]he Sherman Act provides no
remedy for imbalance of market power as such, absent certain types of abuse," id., and
stressed that section 1 "does not preclude a party from unilaterally determining the parties with whom it will deal and the terms on which it will transact business . . . even
where, as here, the buyers are big and the sellers are comparatively small," id. at 1205.
The message in monopsony terms was blunted, however, because no section 2 claims
were pressed in Quality Auto Body.
122. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
123. 574 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 745 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985).
124. 574 F. Supp. at 469-70.
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plans like the defendant.

25

They asserted that the defendant had

"monopsony power as a buyer of prepaid dental services" in the
market for the purchase of dental services12 6 and claimed that the
monopsony power enabled the defendant "to pay ten percent less
for dental services provided to its [insureds] than is paid for dental
care provided to other persons." 127 The result of this alleged exercise of monopsony
power was to suppress the income of Penn28
sylvania dentists.

Rather than allege monopsonization of the market for the
purchase of dental services, the dentists alleged monopolization of
the market for the sale of dental insurance. 2 9 Their apparent theory was that the defendant was using the price advantage gained by
its exercise of monopsony power to undercut and thereby exclude
its competitors in the sale of prepaid dental services insurance. 3 '
As the court recognized, that theory raised serious standing questions because the dentists did not compete in the market allegedly
monopolized-the sale of prepaid dental services insurance.'
2

But

3
the defendant had not raised a standing defense.
Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding no factual support for the dentists' contentions.' 33
There was no evidence that the defendant had monopoly power in
the alleged market for the sale of prepaid dental service insurance. 34 The court did not examine whether the defendant had monopsony power in the purchase of "bulk" prepaid dental services.
The court apparently found that examination unnecessary because
the plaintiffs had not actually alleged that the claimed use of monopsony power violated the Sherman Act. The Third Circuit, in
affirming the summary judgment, appeared to construe the district
court's analysis as though the district court had found no evidence
to support a monopsony in the alleged market for the purchase of
125. Id.
126. Id. at 470.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 469.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 470-73.
134. Id. at 472. See also Barry v. Blue Cross, 805 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1986) (no
evidence that defendant insurer monopolized market for medical insurance); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334-40 (7th Cir. 1986) (no
evidence that providers of health care financing monopolized market for "preferred provider organization" plans).
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dental services in "bulk."' 35
The antitrust significance of monopsony power was finally
presented for examination in Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. 136 In Kartell, the plaintiff physicians attacked their participation agreements with Massachusetts Blue Shield, a prepaid
insurance plan, because the agreements forbade them from "balance billing" Blue Shield's insureds.' 37 The practice of balance
billing involves charging the insureds any amounts by which their
physicians' fees exceeded the amounts Blue Shield would pay them
under the participation agreements.' 38 The district court, after
trial, found the ban an unreasonable trade restraint in violation of
section 1 because of the defendant's monopsony power over physician services.13 9 On appeal, the First Circuit assumed that Blue
Shield had monopsony power and had exercised it "to obtain
'lower than competitive' prices" from physicians."
In analyzing the merits of the physicians' monopsony power
claim, the First Circuit stressed that a necessary predicate to the
claim's validity would be "that the law forbids a buyer with market
power to bargain for 'uncompetitive' or 'unreasonable' prices." ''
The court rejected that predicate, stressing that "[a] legitimate
buyer is entitled to use its market power to keep prices down."' 42
The court also observed that such a theory puts in issue "low
'
and emphasized that Congress intended
prices, not high prices," 143
the Sherman Act "as a way of protecting consumers against prices
that were too high, not too low."" Accordingly, the First Circuit
warned that "courts at least should be cautious-reluctant to condemn too speedily-an arrangement that, on its face, appears to
bring price benefits to the consumer."' 45 Thus, the court rejected
the plaintiffs' monopsonization claims, entering judgment for Blue
135.

Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n, 745 F.2d at 262.

136. 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985).
137. Id. at 923.
138. Id.
139. 582 F. Supp. 734, 755 (D. Mass.), aff'd in part, revd in part, 749 F.2d 922 (lst
Cir. 1984), cert. denied. 471 U.S. 1029 (1985); see Custom Auto Body, 1983-2 Trade Cas.

(CCH) 65,629 (D.R.I. 1983).
140. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 927.
141.

Id.

142.

Id. at 929. This holding plainly conflicts with the contrary proposition that un-

derlies the district court's analysis in Custom Auto Body. See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
143. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 930.

144. Id. at 931 (emphasis in original).
145. Id. Regarding the consumer welfare focus of antitrust law, see supra notes 9-10
and accompanying text.
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Shield. 46
'
In Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance,
Inc.,

147

monopsonization as a section 2 violation was the very es-

sence of the plaintiffs' case. In Ball Memorial Hospital, the plaintiff hospitals complained that the announced implementation of a
"preferred provider organization"1 48 by Indiana Blue Cross, a prepaid insurance plan, would have anticompetitive effects on both the
market for the sale of health care financing plans and the market
for the sale of hospital services.149 The claim failed because the
plaintiffs could not establish market power on the part of Blue
Cross. 5 " On appeal, the Seventh Circuit declined an invitation by
Indiana Blue Cross to determine whether the hospitals' monopsonization claim stated a cause of action under section 2.111 The
court's analysis of the case, however, indicates hostility to the viability of such a claim.
In their attempt to save their case against the findings that Blue
Cross lacked market power, the hospitals argued that, under section 2, "any firm with a large market share has an obligation not to
augment that share at the expense of rivals and may not drive hard
bargains."' 5 2 The court considered the hospital's contention an argument that "intent to get the best price is a bad intent."' 53 Thus
146. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 931.
147. 603 F. Supp. 1077 (S.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd, 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986).
148. A "preferred provider organization" or "PPO" is a health care financing mechanism that uses financial incentives to prompt insureds enrolled in the PPO to select designated or "preferred" providers of health care services. The incentive typically used is to
require insureds to make a substantial co-payment when they select a "non-preferred"
provider while paying 100 percent of the covered expenses when they select a "preferred"
provider. See 603 F. Supp. at 1078, 1081-83; Youle & Daw, supra note 3, at 302-04.

PPOs may be contrasted with traditional prepaid health insurance, which usually provides coverage regardless of the provider selected by the insured, and with "health maintenance organizations" or "HMOs," which generally provide coverage only when the
insured uses a provider affiliated with the HMO. See Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d at

1329-30.
149.
150.

Ball Memorial Hosp., 603 F. Supp. at 1079.
Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1334-40. The same defect in section 2 claims

by physicians against a prepaid medical service insurance plan was recently found in
Barry v. Blue Cross, 805 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1986).
151. See Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1340-41. Indiana Blue Cross had argued
on appeal that the Seventh Circuit should direct a judgment against the plaintiffs' monopsony claim. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 18-25, Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d 1325

(7th Cir. 1986). The court considered the question not ripe for decision because the appeal was from denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction and the record was not
closed. Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1331, 1341.
152. Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1337.
153. Id. at 1338. In advancing the argument, the hospitals had relied on Mandeville
Island Farms, 334 U.S. 219 (1948). The court, however, recognized that that case was
inapposite because "Mandeville was a conspiracy to depress prices, and price-fixing car-
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stated, the infirmity in the argument became transparent. As explained by the court, the defendant's "intent . . . to buy medical
care for less ... is just another description for hard bargaining and
even a monopolist may bargain hard."" 4
IV.

MONOPSONY AND A RULE OF PER SE LEGALITY

No court has yet accepted monopsonization as a viable section 2
claim, notwithstanding the implications of its viability in some
cases.155 The Kartell court rejected such a claim, 56 and no case
law precedent provides a sound basis for the proscription of monopsony by section 2.157 More importantly, the goal of antitrust
policy and the danger of deterring competitive conduct recommend the result that unilateral exercise of monopsony power ought
not be subject to Sherman Act sanction.
A.

Antitrust Policy

Courts and commentators generally agree that the policy goal of
antitrust law is to enhance consumer welfare through the preservation of competition and the promotion of economic efficiency.' 58
Hard bargaining by buyers, regardless of their size, advances that
goal. It forces sellers to compete more vigorously, to cut prices or
improve products to win the business, and to seek ways to produce
more efficiently. When the buyer is the consumer, these benefits
flow directly to the intended beneficiaries of antitrust policy. Even
when the buyer is an intermediary, as is generally the situation in
health care markets where third-party payors predominate, consumers still benefit because the intermediaries, for their own competitive purposes, tend to pass on the savings to their customers. I "
tels are unlawful independent of their efficacy." Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1338
see supra note 56. In contrast, the defendant in Ball Memorial Hosp. was "a single firm,
and the acts of single firms are judged by a different standard under § 2." Ball Memorial
Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1338; see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
154. Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1339; see supra notes 88-91 and accompanying
text.
155. See supra notes 45-154 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 45-154 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
159. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.

1093 (1973). In that case, a competitor claimed that a Blue Cross plan's use of alleged
monopsony power to obtain hospital discounts which enabled the plan to charge cheaper
premiums than its rivals violated Sherman Act sections 1 and 2. The court, assuming the
existence of the alleged monopsony power, nevertheless rejected the claims:
In its negotiating with hospitals, Blue Cross has done no more than conduct its
business as every rational enterprise does, i.e., get the best deal possible. This
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These fundamental economic principles apply to health care
markets. Physicians, for example, are professionals marketing extraordinary skill under high ethical standards. But that does not
insulate them either from the economic realities of the marketplace
or the reach of antitrust law. 6 ' Likewise, not-for-profit hospitals
and medical centers perform laudable and necessary social services
in providing charity care and medical research. But that suspends
neither the operation of the marketplace nor the application of antitrust law.16 '
pressure encourages hospitals to keep their costs down; and, for its own competitive advantage, Blue Cross passes along the saving thus realized to consumers.
To be sure, Blue Cross' initiative makes life harder for commercial competitors
such as [the plaintiff]. The antitrust laws, however, protect competition, not
competitors; and stiff competition is encouraged, not condemned.
Id. at 84.
In Ball Memorial Hosp., the hospitals had argued that Blue Cross' efforts to get lower
prices were forcing them to "cost-shift" to other insurers the amounts of the discounts to
Blue Cross, thereby raising the costs of Blue Cross' rivals to their competitive disadvantage. See Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1339-40. Among the many infirmities in this
"cost-shift" theory is that it attempts to condemn rational efforts by buyers to get the
lowest possible price, which has the effect of promoting seller-efficiency and enhancing
competition. See Feldman v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 941, 950 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield, 544 F. Supp. 230, 238 n.2 (N.D. Cal.
1981), aff'dpercuriam, 677 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); Youle
& Daw, supra note 3, at 311-12, 369.
In rejecting the "cost-shift" theory in Ball Memorial Hosp. because of the absence of
market power, the Seventh Circuit made the accurate observation that "[i]t is ... hard to
see why, if the Hospitals can raise their prices to other buyers of their services, they do
not do so whether or not they join the [Blue Cross] PPO plan." Ball Memorial Hosp.,
784 F.2d at 1340.
160. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists. 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986) (dentists' coalition
"not entitled to preempt the working of the market by deciding for itself that its customers do not need that which they demand"); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (ethical canon prohibiting competitive bidding violates
Sherman Act § I); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (bar association
rule setting minimum legal fees violates Sherman Act § 1). See generally Weller. supra
note 3. Some commentators have suggested that health care practitioner licensure and
credentialing diminish consumer welfare by restraining competition. See Baron, Licensure of Health Care Professionals: The Consumer's Case for Abolition, 9 AM. J.L. & MI).
335 (1983); Havighurst & King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel. An Antitrust Perspective (pts. I & 2), 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 263 (1983). For a response to these
views, see Rankin & Hubbard, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel. A Pragmatic Response to Academic Theory, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 189 (1984).
161. In In re Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 504 (1985), enforced, 807 F.2d
1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987), a merger case. the Federal
Trade Commission warned: "If hospitals have a definition of output maximization or
quality maximization that is different from the competitive [i.e., economically efficient]
levels of output and quality, then any concerted action in furtherance of their goals will
be anticompetitive."
In Ball Memorial Hosp., the hospitals moved for a preliminary injunction, asserting
that the lower prices sought by the Blue Cross PPO would reduce their ability to fund
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The providers' clientele is changing. While it remains the individual which needs the care, it has become the insurer, the employer, or government that usually pays the bill. It is these payors
that, in an antitrust sense, are the consumers of health care, 6 2 and
it is they that are demanding constraints on the size of their health
care bills. Among the most effective constraints is the workings of
an open marketplace. The cost-containment demands of these
payors, won through hard bargaining with providers forced to
compete for their business, thus serves well the policy goals of antitrust by rewarding the efficient provider which can offer the better
product or the same product at a lower price.' 6 3 Thus, to permit
health care providers, indeed, any sellers, to invoke section 2 to
discipline powerful buyers who seek low prices is to subvert the
pro-consumer goals of the Sherman Act.' 64
Moreover, the test for application of the rule of per se illegality-conduct that "facially. . . always or almost always tend[s] to
restrict competition and decrease output" 65-supports a rule of
per se legality for monopsony. Hard bargaining to extract low
prices, even by a monopsonist, is conduct that facially appears to
increase economic efficiency and render markets more competitive.
An exercise of monopsony power may theoretically cause consumer harm by reducing output in the market in which the monopsonist buys and thereby causing resource misallocation.1 66 This
was indeed the thrust of the competitive injury asserted by the phymedical education and charity care, thereby resulting in a public harm. See Brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1985). The
Seventh Circuit did not bother to address these non-economic issues. See National Soc'y
of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) ("that competition is not
entirely conducive to ethical behavior. . . is not a reason, cognizable under the Sherman
Act, for doing away with competition").
162. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
163. In National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978), the Supreme Court emphasized
The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition
will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services ....
The
assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free
market recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and
durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free
opportunity to select among alternative offers.

164. As one court succinctly put it: "The failure to make more money ... is simply
not the kind of problem which the antitrust laws address. Quite the contrary, the primary goal of the antitrust laws is consumer welfare, not competitor welfare." Sausalito
Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield, 544 F. Supp. 230, 235 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'dper curiam,
677 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).

165.

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979);

see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.

166.

See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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sicians in Kartell 167 and the hospitals in Ball Memorial Hospital. 6s
But if the monopsonist is not also a monopolist, consumers will
receive the tangible benefit of lower prices in the monopsonist's
output market because of the monopsonist's hard bargaining. Absent a monopoly in its output market, any reduction in a monopsonist's output would only result in lost sales and reduced market
share to the benefit of its output competitors.'69
Thus, an exercise of monopsony power to obtain "below competitive" input prices by a firm, such as a third party payor, that faces
output competition should redound to the benefit of consumers in
the form of cheaper products in the output market.' 70 Penalizing
that conduct under section 2 would diminish a direct and tangible
consumer benefit in favor of avoidance of an indirect consumer
harm caused by the resource misallocation that economic theory
predicts should occur. 17 1 If the firm with monopsony power also
has a monopoly, then any anticompetitive or exclusionary practices can be reached by the section 2 prohibitions against monopolization, and prohibition of monopsonization is not needed to
remedy the anticompetitive effects.
B.

Danger of Deterring Competitive Conduct

While the consumer welfare goal of antitrust law weighs heavily
in favor of per se legality for monopsony, this is not a complete
answer. Monopsony may be rare,' 72 but if it exists, it theoretically
would cause economic inefficiency.' 73 What tips the balance conclusively in favor of per se legality is that the judicial system lacks
devices sufficiently delicate to detect the difference between hard
bargaining and abuse of buyer power.
Because the outcome of antitrust litigation often turns on infer167.
168.

See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.

169. See IV P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, at 204.
170. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009, 2020 (1986) (insurers
"are themselves in competition for the patronage of the patients. . . and must satisfy their
potential customers not only that they will provide coverage at a reasonable cost, but also
that that coverage will be adequate to meet their customers' dental needs"). Cf Hospital
Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975
(1987).
171.

Any competitive advantage in the output market gained simply through the ex-

ercise of a firm's monopsony purchasing power would not be sufficient to support a section 2 claim. See supra note 159.
172. The Supreme Court has cautioned that the rarity of an anticompetitive practice
is not a sufficient basis for declaring it per se legal. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc.,
107 S. Ct. 484, 495 (1986).
173. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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ences drawn by the trier-of-fact from generally ambiguous evidence
of conduct, intent and purpose,' 7 4 the litigation process used to determine the division between antitrust violation and exoneration is
inherently imperfect. Neither judge nor jury has available an absolute litmus test for truth; rather, each must rely on such things as
perceptions, credibility, and nuance to try to decipher if challenged
conduct really is anticompetitive. That task, difficult in any context, is especially difficult when the trier-of-fact is asked to draw
the line between legitimate efforts of a large buyer to get low prices
and abuse of monopsony power to depress price below competitive
levels.
The cost of a mistake in making that determination is very high
in terms of social welfare. It would result in disciplining hard bargaining, the very competitive activity the Sherman Act protects, by
submitting powerful buyers mistaken as monopsonists to treble
damages and the other considerable expense and burden of antitrust litigation. This is what nearly occurred, for example, in
Kartell, where Massachusetts Blue Shield's efforts to control costs
to its insured by delivering a fully prepaid product were almost
thwarted by the district court's view that the balance billing ban
unreasonably restrained physicians' freedom to charge as much as
they wished.175
The Supreme Court recently recognized the negative implications for antitrust policy when the potential for such grave mistakes is likely. Addressing claims of predatory pricing in
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,76 the

Court acknowledged that "cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition."' 77 The Court then
stressed that "mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust
laws are designed to protect."' 78
This observation is perhaps even more true when applied to
purchasing activities that yield low prices. Indeed, to allow com174.

See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464. 473 (1962).

175.

See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.

176. 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
177. Id. at 1360.
178. Id. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68
(1984), the Supreme Court similarly observed:
In part because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from

conduct with long-run anticompetitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman
Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization.
Judging unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust
laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur.
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petitive conduct like hard bargaining to serve as a basis for a Sherman Act claim "could have the very serious consequence of
deterring, and indeed prohibiting (if a court made an improper diagnosis of the defendant's conduct) desirable and competitive
behavior." 179
The very threat that disgruntled sellers could invoke the Sherman Act when displeased with the deals offered by powerful buyers
is sufficient to chill hard bargaining and its beneficial impact on
competition and consumers. Antitrust litigation is notoriously
protracted and expensive. Consequently, its avoidance, even when
claims are frivolous, has a significant value. 8 ' To end this threat
and the even greater harm to the goals of antitrust law that would
flow from misconstruing hard bargaining as monopsony abuse, a
rule of per se legality should be adopted. Courts should reject on
their face section 2 claims premised on unilateral abuse of buyer
power.
V.

CONCLUSION

Health care markets have become fertile grounds for the cultivation of section 2 theories premised on monopsony power. Providers under the pinch of cost containment have been particularly
adventurous in seeking antitrust theories to discipline the hard bargaining tactics of third-party payors. Out of these adventures has
emerged the use of monopsony as a section 2 weapon. That
weapon should be blunted by a declaration that unilateral exercise
of monopsony power does not violate section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
The consumer welfare goals of antitrust are particularly wellserved when hard bargaining is encouraged. The cost that would
flow from deterring legitimate bargaining by subjecting it to the
potential of section 2 liability is too high to permit monopsony
claims that threaten to tame big buyers' efforts to get low prices.
Those principles apply in health care markets as in any other.
179. General Communications Eng'g Inc. v. Motorola Communications & Elecs.,
Inc., 421 F. Supp. 274, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Cf Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions and
Monopoly Power, 64 B.U.L. REV. 521, 545-46 (1984) (arguing for a rule of per se legality
for certain vertical relationships).
180. The Shapiro court, for example, remarked that the in terrorem impact of an
antitrust complaint often has settlement value "out of any proportion to its prospects of
success at trial." Shapiro, 472 F. Supp. at 660. Cf MCI Communications Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1112-14 (7th Cir. 1983) (commenting on how
expensive and unworkable an "intent-test" to determine below-cost pricing would be),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891.
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Indeed, perhaps to a greater extent because of the market imperfections and complexity of health care delivery and the apparent willingness of providers to use the Sherman Act as a sword to attack
cost-containment initiatives of third-party payors. There should be
no special rule that insulates health care providers from competitive pressures. The social goals of antitrust law serve consumers in
health care markets as well as in other markets. Those goals will
be better served by adoption of a rule of per se legality for unilateral exercises of monopsony power.

